The rise of artificial intelligence (AI) challenges foundational assumptions of copyright law, particularly the requirement of human authorship. In Thaler v. PerlmuGer, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the U.S. Copyright Office’s denial of registration for an AI-generated artwork, holding that the Copyright Act’s use of “author” inherently requires human creativity. This Note critiques Thaler’s statutory interpretation and proposes a novel framework to reconcile AI’s disruptive potential with copyright’s human-centric purpose. First, it argues that the court erred in conflating the statutory term “author”—a legal fiction encompassing corporate entities under work-made-for-hire doctrine—with colloquial “authorship,” which denotes creative origination. By dissecting provisions of the Copyright Act such as § 201(b) and § 302, this analysis demonstrates that Congress deliberately decoupled the “author” status (which denotes legal ownership) from “authorship” (which denotes human creativity). Second, this Note warns that rigid adherence to Thaler’s logic risks enabling AI to exploit corporate personhood doctrines, thereby circumventing the human authorship requirement. To safeguard copyright’s constitutional purpose, this Note advocates for a semantic severance: explicitly acknowledge “author” as the legal term of art it is, separate from colloquial notions of authorship. This approach balances innovation with copyright’s goal of promoting creativity for the public’s benefit, ensuring AI serves as a tool for—not a replacement of—human expression.
